A decade after the 9/11 attacks, large tracts of America’s most prominent downtown areas remain sealed off as security zones, where access and mobility are significantly restricted, all in the name of anti-terrorism. A new study says questions this policy, claiming it has led to blighted landscapes, limited public access and a need for a new approach to urban planning.
“It’s as if our most open, public cities are becoming police states,” said Jeremy Németh, director of the urban design program at the University of Colorado – Denver.
Németh told Homeland1 that while a certain amount of security is necessary, no amount of anti-terror architecture would have stopped the 9/11 attacks, or the Madrid or London transit bombings.
And by limiting access or closing off civic areas, the potential for more eyes-on-the-street to catch possible terror acts in progress is limited. Németh maintains that easy access can mean more safety, not less. This was illustrated last May, when a vigilant T-shirt vendor spotted a bomb-filled SUV in New York’s Times Square.
Although other studies have analyzed security zones in single cities, Németh’s paper is the first to compare the security landscape in public and private districts in more than one city. He looked at areas of downtown Los Angeles, New York City and San Francisco and found that while each city values and protects potential targets equally, what is deemed off-limits varies widely.
In New York, 35.7 percent of the civic center district is within a security zone, meaning it is accessible only to those with proper clearance, while only 3.4 percent of San Francisco’s civic center area has the same designation. Meanwhile, 23 acres of public space in Los Angeles now sit in a security zone.
“This ubiquity, in addition to the continued terror threats like the recent plots to bomb downtown Portland and New York City, forces us to consider security zones a new type of land use, similar to parks, open space and sidewalks,” Németh said.
Németh argues that security zones must be planned and designed in ways that involve the public and are useful to downtown built environments. “Right now they consist of haphazard placement of metal gates, Jersey barriers and cones, but if these are to become permanent additions to the urban landscapes, we must understand how to integrate them into the existing built fabric,” he said.
And as things stand, these zones not only affect the appearance of landmark buildings, but also reflect an “architecture of fear,” as evidenced by the bunker-like appearance of embassies and other perceived targets.
“These places impart a dual message, simultaneously reassuring the public while causing a sense of unease,” Németh said.
Németh found that security zones are most often located around high-profile public buildings where protests and public dissent most often take place, which has the effect of limiting opportunity for free expression, yet the lifeblood of cities lies in their diversity and difference.
“Without the opportunity to move freely through the city or engage with strangers, urban life begins to wane,” he said.